INTRODUCTION
This paper has two main sections, each addressing an important issue in railway safety. The first part of the paper is concerned with the level of risk on the national system, and the long-term trends in the risk over the period from 1967 to 2003. The paper focuses particularly on fatal train collisions, derailments and overruns, because these are particularly important, even though they account for only a minority of fatalities. The paper shows that railway safety has greatly improved over the long term, and contrary to popular belief, safety trends did not deteriorate after privatisation in 1994.
The second part of the paper is concerned with criteria for the adoption of railway safety measures, particularly the principle that risks should be 'as low as reasonably practicable' (ALARP), and the interpretation of the ALARP principle as requiring a balance between the marginal costs and benefits of safety measures. The estimation of the benefits of safety measures requires the valuation in monetary terms of the prevention of casualties. Such valuations have a long history in the context of road safety, and were introduced to the railway context in the early 1990s. The paper finds that in practice the costs of some adopted railway safety measures such as the train protection and warning system (TPWS) exceed the benefits, whereas the benefits of many non-adopted road schemes exceed the costs. It follows that society could prevent more fatalities at the same cost by devoting relatively more resources to road safety and less to rail safety. Nevertheless, the TPWS has been widely welcomed, and society seems to be content with the present allocation of resources.
The paper is a revised and updated version of a presentation made to the Railway Civil Engineers' Association at the Institution of Civil Engineers in November 2002.
RAILWAY ACCIDENTS AND FATALITIES

Railway fatalities in Great Britain: 1967-2002
Railway accidents are traditionally classified as train accidents, movement accidents or non-movement accidents. Train accidents are those in which a train is damaged and casualties may occur; movement accidents are those in which a person is injured due to the movement of a train, but the train itself is not damaged; non-movement accidents are other injuries on railway property.
The number of accidental fatalities in the 36 years from 1967 to 2002 on all railways of Great Britain was 2903, excluding trespassers and suicides. Of these, 642 were in train accidents, including collisions between trains and road vehicles; 1887 were in movement accidents, and 374 were in non-movement accidents. Of the 642 fatalities in train accidents, 592 were on the national railway system, and 50 were on other railways. Of the 592 on the national system, 320 were in train collisions derailments and overruns on running lines, 230 were in collisions between trains and road vehicles (of which 36 were train occupants), and 42 were in other train accidents such as train fires. This paper focuses on the mainline collisions, derailments and overruns, because these are important and high profile, but readers should be aware that these account for only about 11% of all railway fatalities, even when trespasser fatalities and suicides are excluded. The data in this paragraph are taken from a report by Evans, 1 which is in turn derived principally from HM Railway Inspectorate annual reports. There were 80 fatal train collisions, derailments and overruns on running lines of Great Britain's mainline railway system from 1967 to 2003. Table 1 summarises these, together with the numbers of train-km and the calculated numbers of accidents per train-km. The accidents are subdivided into those that would have been preventable by automatic train protection (ATP) and those that would not. The ATP-preventable accidents are further subdivided into those due to signals passed at danger (SPADs), and those due to overspeeding or buffer overruns. The SPAD accidents are subdivided into those involving a train passing a signal protecting a conflicting movement, and those involving trains proceeding in the same direction on the same track, a 'plain-line' SPAD. Of the 80 accidents, 15 were due to conflicting movement SPADs, eight were due to plain-line SPADs, nine were due to ATP-preventable excess speeds or buffer overruns, and 48 were non-ATP-preventable. 
The train protection and warning system (TPWS)
It was largely in response to the persistent problem of conflicting-movement SPADs that the train protection and warning system (TPWS) was developed in the late 1990s as an alternative to full ATP in order to reduce the frequency of ATP-preventable accidents. TPWS was installed quickly and had been completed by the end of 2003. 3 It became effective largely during 2002 and 2003. TPWS is expected to make a step reduction in ATP-preventable risk. Before installation, it was estimated to be capable of reducing ATP-preventable accidents and casualties by about 70%. 4 In early 2003, Railway
Safety made another estimate of its effectiveness using the Safety Risk Model, and came to much the same conclusion.
5
This author at present has no independent method of estimating the post-TPWS ATP-preventable risk, so adopts the pre-installation estimate that it reduces ATP-preventable accidents and casualties by 70%. The lower fork at the righthand end of Fig. 1 shows the effect of this on the trend in fatal accidents per train-km. Table 2 accident rates are 84% less than in 1967, which represents an average reduction of 5 . 1% per year over the 37-year period. The post-TPWS accident rates are about 90% less than in 1967.
Estimated mean accidents and fatalities for 2003
Rail privatisation and safety
Because of the severe train accidents at Southall, Ladbroke Grove, Hatfield and Potters Bar, it is widely believed that rail privatisation had an adverse impact on safety. The data on train accidents do not support this belief.
Two It follows that the fatal accidents that have actually occurred since privatisation have been slightly fewer than those expected on the basis of the favourable trend established by British Rail. Thus there is no evidence that the postprivatisation performance is worse than British Rail might be expected to have achieved.
The second analysis is similar in nature, but based on HM Railway Inspectorate's series of 'significant train accidents', which is available from 1971 to 2002/03. Significant train accidents are train collisions, derailments and overruns affecting passenger trains or passenger lines. These accidents had the potential to be serious, even though most of them were not. The benefit of analysing this class of accident is that they are much more numerous than fatal train accidents (by a factor of the order of 100), and therefore the results are less subject to statistical fluctuation. They include the fatal accidents analysed above, but they are dominated by numerous nonfatal accidents. The data cover the non-national as well as the national railways.
The pattern in Fig. 3 is similar to that in Fig. 2 
SAFETY VALUES AND SAFETY COSTS
The 'tolerability of risk' framework
The standard framework for appraising risks and safety measures on the railways is the 'tolerability of risk' (ToR) framework, first propounded by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in the context of nuclear power stations in 1988, and revised in 1992. 6 The ToR framework was represented by HSE in their policy document Reducing Risks, Protecting People, 7 and is now widely accepted as applicable to other risks besides nuclear. The framework came to be applied to the railways because from the early 1990s there was a need for systematic appraisal of safety measures (notably ATP), and HSE had then become the railway safety regulator. There is widespread agreement that although appraisal frameworks such as ToR are an essential input to good decisions, they should be regarded as informative rather than compelling. This is because almost all specific safety decisions require ethical and political judgements that may be crucial, but which are outside the scope of such frameworks.
The ToR framework combines a near-prohibition on relatively high levels of individual risk with a considered trade-off between risks and safety benefits at lower levels of risk. The trade-off is generally described as the principle that risks should be 'as low as reasonably practicable' (ALARP). For many risks, the requirement that they should be ALARP is met by adopting good practice. However, where analysis is required, the ALARP principle has come to be interpreted as a requirement that the benefits and costs of safety measures should be compared, normally in monetary units. Because the principal benefits of many safety measures are the prevention of fatalities and injuries, this requires valuing the prevention of casualties. The value of preventing fatalities (VPF) is discussed in section 3.2.
The simplest interpretation of the benefit/cost comparison is that if the benefits of a safety measure are greater than or equal to its costs, the safety measure should be implemented.
On the other hand, if the benefits of a safety measure are less than its costs, the safety measure should not necessarily be implemented. This is broadly the interpretation placed on it both by the railway industry in the Railway Group Safety Plan 8 and by HSE in Reducing Risks, Protecting People, 7 although both sources emphasise that there are circumstances in which safety measures should be implemented even though the valued benefits may be less than the costs. HSE also refers to the Edwards v. National Coal Board court case, 9 which states that a safety duty holder must implement safety measures up to the point at which the costs are not merely equal to the value of the risks, but 'grossly disproportionate' to them. However, the VPFs currently used in ALARP calculations are much greater than the typical compensation awarded for fatalities by courts, so it could be argued that the current VPFs already incorporate a factor for 'gross disproportion'.
The quantitative application of the ToR framework thus in principle requires two sets of parameters. The first set is the boundary or boundaries between tolerable and intolerable levels of individual risks. The second set is the values of preventing casualties, mentioned above and further discussed in section 3 . 2.
The boundary between tolerable and intolerable individual risks is widely accepted as being an ethical judgement. In their original presentation HSE proposed that the upper limit to the tolerable risk of death for employees should be 1 in 1000 per year and that for third parties should be 1 in 10 000 per year. These values have stood the test of time and are the same in HSE's most recent policy document Reducing Risks, Protecting People. 7 However, these values are not critical for railways, because even the highest individual risks on the railways are generally well below these limits. Railway risks, safety values and safety costs 50 years for use in the appraisal of road investment and road safety projects. Their methods have evolved over time.
Valuations of preventing fatalities
The widely accepted principle for valuing the effects of public policies or projects is that these should be valued according to the preferences of those who are affected. In safety, these preferences are now measured by estimates of people's 'willingness to pay' for risk reductions in specified contexts. The DfT's VPF is based on the total amount that a large group of people would be willing to pay for small reductions in risk to each person that could be expected on average to save one fatality among them. From time to time the DfT commissions surveys to provide data to estimate these values; the most recent was by a consortium of universities in 1998. 10 In years without surveys, the DfT updates the previous year's VPF by increasing it in proportion to the index of gross domestic product (GDP) per head. As the country gradually becomes wealthier, this index rises faster than inflation, so that the VPF has gradually risen in real terms. The DfT's most recent published VPF for roads is £1 . 25 million for 2002. 11 This figure also includes the public costs of fatalities such as medical costs.
The DfT also uses 'willingness to pay' evidence, together with data on medical costs, to estimate the valuations of preventing injuries on the road, but for reasons of space these are not discussed in this paper.
Rail fatalities.
When British Rail adopted the ToR framework in the early 1990s, they needed a VPF for railway fatalities. After substantial internal debate, but no public surveys, they adopted the current roads VPF for fatalities in movement and non-movement accidents, but a higher VPF for fatalities in train accidents. This was because British Rail judged that people would be willing to pay more to prevent fatalities in train accidents, primarily because passengers have no control over the risks. At that time, the latest roads VPF was £715 000 at 1992 prices. British Rail adopted a round-figure VPF of £2 million for fatalities in train accidents at the same price level, which was 2 . 8 times greater than the roads/ movement/non-movement VPF. As the roads VPF has been increased in the following years, the national railway operators have maintained the ratio of 2 . 8, so for example, the road/basic rail VPF in 2002 to 2003 was £1 . 25 million, and the VPF for fatalities in train accidents was £3 . 46 million.
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There have been two major empirical research studies on the rail VPF. 13, 14 They were both commissioned by HSE, and were linked to Chilton et al.'s 1998 study of the roads VPF mentioned above. 10 Both studies aimed to estimate the rail VPF relative to the roads value. (The studies also considered VPFs for fatalities due to fires in the home and in public places, but those are not discussed here.) The surveys for the first study were carried out in four towns spread over Britain in the autumn of 1998, which was about a year after the train collision at Southall on 19 September 1997 and a year before the train collision at Ladbroke Grove on 5 October 1999. The Ladbroke Grove collision caused such public concern about railway safety that, to their credit, HSE commissioned a second set of surveys in early 2000 to investigate whether people's valuations had changed. The second surveys were similar to the first, except that they were carried out in towns in south-east England where rail use is higher than the national average.
The results of the rail surveys were surprising. Contrary to expectation, people in the first survey had a slightly smaller, not a larger, mean VPF for rail than road fatalities: the average ratio of rail to road was 0 . 83. In the second survey, conducted when the Ladbroke Grove accident was fresh in respondents' minds, the average ratio had moved somewhat towards a higher rail VPF, but was still only 1 . 00. Even for regular rail users, the ratio was only 1 . 17. Although the ratios of 0 . 83 and 1 . 17 were statistically significantly different from 1 . 00 in different directions, the numerical differences are modest. Therefore the broad conclusion is that the public, including regular rail users after a major accident, appear to place much the same value on the prevention of rail fatalities as they do on preventing road fatalities. The authors concluded: 'If we focus on those who are regular rail users, it would appear that their preferences and attitudes to risk per se provide no justification for Railtrack's higher VPF . . . of some 2 . 8 times the DETR roads figure. The results therefore suggest that if a justification for Railtrack's higher figure is to be found, then it will almost certainly need to be sought in considerations other than the preferences of the travelling public.' For the prevention of fatalities on the road, the bestdocumented safety measures are local road-safety engineering projects. These are generally small in scale, but are numerous. The remarkable feature of such projects is their extremely high rates of return. A 1997 review of such schemes by the Department of Transport stated: 'The Department has monitored the introduction of recent local safety schemes and this is one of the few areas where expenditure is underpinned by a considerable amount of knowledge about costs and benefits. Clear benefits can be shown, with the first-year rate of return of these schemes typically in excess of 150%.' 16 Such returns imply that, even if the average project produced benefits over a period of only six or seven years, the value of the accident savings would be ten times the cost; or equivalently, that the cost is only 10% of the value. This implies that the cost of preventing a road fatality by such schemes is only about £100 000. Other sources, such as local authority road-safety plans support that conclusion. Evans provides a brief review. 17 One might expect that the costs of saving road casualties would rise gradually as the 'easy' schemes were tackled first, but that does not appear to be happening. Because road-safety budgets and staff are constrained, highway authorities look to implement schemes with good returns. Schemes with more modest, but still positive, returns therefore tend not to be implemented. because Network Rail assumes an effective life for TPWS of 25 rather than 20 years. However, the most interesting aspect of Network Rail's evidence was the estimate that about 90% of equivalent fatalities could be prevented for only one-third of the expenditure, and that the remaining 10% required twothirds of the expenditure. This implies that the average cost per fatality prevented for the first 90% was about £4 million, but that the average cost per fatality prevented for the last 10% was about £70 million. Table 3 summarises the information assembled in this section. It is notable that for the road-safety measures considered the values of preventing fatalities substantially exceed their costs, whereas for the rail protection measures considered the costs exceed the values.
Summary and discussion
We began this section with a discussion of the ToR framework, which in principle requires the implementation of all safety measures for which the value per prevented fatality exceeds the cost. It is clear from Table 3 that the ToR framework is not applied in practice to the road system, because there are many potential road-safety measures for which the value exceeds the cost, but which are not implemented. The reason for nonimplementation is the constraint on resources, but in other fields resource constraints are not accepted as a valid reason for non-implementation of reasonably practicable safety measures.
On the other hand, railways go beyond the requirements of the ToR framework in the field of train protection. Although BR-ATP was not implemented across the network, the cost per fatality prevented by TPWS as implemented exceeds its value. Even with the more limited version of TPWS originally envisaged, the cost per fatality prevented appears to be slightly greater than the higher of the two VPFs used by the Railway Group, and that VPF is not supported by the 'willingness to pay' evidence discussed in section 3.2.2. Furthermore, the individual risks on the railways are relatively low, so there is no case for special safety measures to prevent the risks being intolerably high. Therefore TPWS as implemented is not justified within the ToR framework alone. Indeed, it was for that reason that specific regulations were made effectively to override the ToR framework. 21 Nevertheless, it is notable that TPWS has been almost universally welcomed, because it has substantially reduced a persistent and important source of railway risk.
It is clear from the preceding discussion that society could prevent more fatalities at the same cost by devoting relatively more resources to road safety and less to rail safety. It remains a puzzle that society chooses not to do so, and is apparently content with the present allocation of resources. 
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